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PREDICTIVE PROSECUTION
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson*
INTRODUCTION
Police in major metropolitan areas now use “predictive policing”
technologies to identify and deter crime.1 Based on algorithmic
forecasts from past crime patterns and individual criminal risk
factors, police claim to be able to identify places and persons more
likely to be involved in criminal activity.2
This data-driven
approach impacts police patrols, investigations, and public health—
like strategies to disrupt and monitor forecasted criminal activity.3
The early success of predictive policing has led a few
prosecutors’ offices to adopt quasi-“predictive prosecution”
strategies.4
Predictive prosecution involves identifying and
targeting suspects deemed more at risk for future serious criminal
activity, and then using that information to shape bail requests,
charging decisions, and sentencing arguments.5 The potential
problem, however, is that the data used to inform predictive
prosecution strategies may be subject to the same vulnerabilities
currently limiting predictive policing.6 Data can be bad, biased, or
based on erroneous correlations.7 Data-driven justice challenges
*

Professor of Law, UDC David A. Clarke School of Law. Thank you to
Professor Kami Chavis for inviting me to the 2016 Spring Symposium of the
Wake Forest Law Review: Implementing De-Incarceration Strategies: Policies
and Practices to Reduce Crime and Mass Incarceration.
1. See, e.g., Ellen Huet, Server and Protect, FORBES, Mar. 2, 2015, at 46,
46.
2. See, e.g., Guy Adams, The Sci-Fi Solution to Real Crime, INDEPENDENT
(London), Jan. 11, 2012, at 32, 32; Erica Goode, Sending the Police Before
There’s a Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2011, at A11; Leslie A. Gordon, A Byte
Out of Crime, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2013, at 18, 18; Predictive Policing: Don’t Even
Think About It, ECONOMIST, July 20, 2013, at 24, 24, 26.
3. See, e.g., Darwin Bond-Graham & Ali Winston, Forget the NSA, the
LAPD Spies on Millions of Innocent Folks, L.A. WKLY. (Feb. 27, 2014, 4:00 AM),
http://www.laweekly.com/news/forget-the-nsa-the-lapd-spies-on-millions-of
-innocent-folks-4473467; John Buntin, Social Science: Facebook and Other
Social Media Networks are Upending the Way Chicago Fights Gang Violence,
GOVERNING, Oct. 2013, at 26, 29; Reducing Murder Rates, PALANTIR TECHS.,
https://www.palantir.com/philanthropy-engineering/annual-report/2015/murder
-reduction/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2016).
4. See infra Part I.
5. See infra Subpart I.C.
6. See infra Subpart II.A.
7. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable
Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 329–30 (2015); Wayne A. Logan & Andrew
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values of transparency, accountability, and autonomy.8 And, while
these problems matter when it comes to questions of where to send a
patrol car, or even whom to investigate, they matter much more
when data directly impacts a prosecutor’s decision about individual
liberty.
Fortunately, prosecutors, more so than police, may have the
institutional capacity and power to ensure an equitable and
accountable use of predictive technologies. Prosecutors, due to their
ethic “to do justice,”9 may be in a better position to ensure that
issues of accuracy, transparency, validity, error, and exculpatory
information are addressed before widespread adoption. Prosecutors
may be able to capitalize on the innovation of predictive analytics
and promote stronger accountability mechanisms that could benefit
the entire criminal justice system.10
This Essay sets out the preliminary questions that prosecutors
should ask before adopting any type of quasi-predictive prosecution
system. Part I provides a brief overview of the growth of predictive
policing and its evolution into predictive prosecution. While still an
experimental concept, certain predictive policing techniques rely on
prosecutorial involvement and action. Primary attention will focus
on two examples of predictive policing/prosecution in Chicago,
Illinois, and Manhattan, in New York.11 The Chicago Police
Department, in conjunction with sociologists, computer scientists,
and social workers, has developed innovative strategies to identify
individuals most likely to be victims of gun violence or perpetrators
of gun violence.12 Once identified, public health–like intervention
Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Criminal Justice Data, 101 MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017).
8. Ferguson, supra note 7, at 329–30.
9. Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 607, 608 (1999).
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Subpart I.C.
12. See Monica Davey, Chicago Tactics Put Major Dent in Killing Trend,
N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2013, at A1; see also TRACEY MEARES ET AL., HOMICIDE AND
GUN VIOLENCE IN CHICAGO: EVALUATION AND SUMMARY OF THE PROJECT SAFE
NEIGHBORHOODS PROGRAM 1 (2009) (“Data analysis immediately revealed that a
very small number of neighborhoods in Chicago are responsible for most of the
city’s violence trends. The ‘city’s’ crime problem is in fact geographically and
socially concentrated in a few highly impoverished and socially isolated
neighborhoods. Data also revealed that most victims (and offenders) of gun
violence in Chicago tend to be young African American men who live in
neighborhoods on the West or South sides of the city.”); Jeremey Gorner, The
Heat List, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 21, 2013, at 1; Mark Guarino, Can Math Stop
Murder?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 20, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com
/USA/2014/0720/Can-math-stop-murder-video (“Armed with a plethora of
statistics on everything from gun violations to individual parole and arrest
histories, police here are trying to create a national model that will help them
predict where shootings might occur and who might be involved—both victims
and offenders.”). See generally Andrew V. Papachristos et al., Attention Felons:

W 08_FERGUSON .DOCX

2016]

(DO NOT DELETE)

PREDICTIVE PROSECUTION

10/13/16 1:17 PM

707

strategies are used to contact and monitor those targeted suspects.13
Prosecutors warn targeted suspects of potential consequences of
future criminal action and then enforce those warnings through
enhanced bail, charging, and sentencing decisions.14 In New York
City, Manhattan District Attorney, Cyrus Vance Jr., created the
Crime Strategies Unit to link and organize previously disparate
prosecutorial databases into a “central nervous system”15 of
information about suspected criminal actors.16
Under this
“Moneyball” prosecution system, police and prosecutors have
targeted approximately nine thousand suspects for investigation
and prosecution.17 Similar to the Chicago model, prosecutors shape
bail, charging, and sentencing decisions based on the information
provided.18
Part II looks at the promise and perils of predictive prosecution.
This part examines three big questions about how predictive
prosecution might impact: (1) prosecutorial decision-making; (2)
prosecutorial role; and (3) crime suppression priorities. From one
angle, predictive prosecution merely strengthens the type of
predictions and risk assessments already employed across the
criminal justice system, but with more extensive informationsharing capabilities.19 From another angle, predictive prosecution
might be seen as a repackaging of the longstanding “focused
deterrence” theories used in some jurisdictions.20 However, whether
revolutionary or merely evolutionary, a risk assessment/public
health model of prosecution may have unintended consequences. If
sentencing decisions are ratcheted up because a suspect was placed
on a target list, then prosecutors better be sure that the list is an
accurate and valid basis for a sentencing enhancement. Correlation
should not replace causation when it comes to actual liberty
deprivations. Further, if police officers link their databases with

Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
223 (2007) (describing the impact of Chicago’s Project Safe Neighborhoods on
crime rates using quasi-experimental design).
13. See Gorner, supra note 12, at 6.
14. See infra Subpart I.C.
15. Aubrey Fox, David O’Keefe, Head of the Manhattan District Attorney’s
Crime Strategies Unit, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION (May 29, 2013),
http://www.courtinnovation.org/research/david-okeefe-head-manhattan-district
-attorneys-crime-strategies-unit.
16. See infra Subpart I.C.2.
17. Chip Brown, The Data D.A., N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 7, 2014, at 22, 24–
25.
18. See infra Subpart I.C.2.
19. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976) (“[P]rediction of future
criminal conduct is an essential element in many of the decisions rendered
throughout our criminal justice system.”).
20. See generally Philip J. Cook, The Great American Gun War: Notes from
Four Decades in the Trenches, 42 CRIME & JUST. AM. 19, 52–53 (2013)
(discussing focused deterrence theory and gun violence).
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prosecutors’ offices, then prosecutors must take ownership of the
quality and accuracy of that information. This Part also looks at the
legal obligations of prosecutors relying on predictive systems. While
generally consistent with ethical duties and within the broad grant
of prosecutorial discretion, data-driven predictions should not be
undertaken without internal accountability mechanisms to ensure
the accuracy and validity of the predictions. In addition, the
growing web of shared information may create Brady obligations for
prosecutors to turn over collectively available exculpatory
information.21
Part III concludes by suggesting that prosecutors may be in the
best position to create mechanisms to ensure accountability,
transparency, and validity consistent with due process and the fair
administration of justice. Satisfactory answers to the questions
raised in Part II will be the first step in evaluating the usefulness of
predictive prosecution nationally.
This Essay seeks to raise
preliminary questions about predictive prosecution, saving for a
future day any empirical assessment of its costs, benefits, and
promise in practice.
I. THE INFLUENCE OF PREDICTIVE POLICING ON PREDICTIVE
PROSECUTION
Predictive prosecution is an outgrowth of the reported success of
predictive policing.22 Predictive policing involves the use of data
collection and analysis to predict areas of crime and individuals
involved in crime.23
The generic term “predictive policing”
encompasses a variety of different techniques, proprietary products,
and tactical uses.24 Predictive-policing technologies are shaping
police strategies in a diverse list of places, including major cities like
Los Angeles, New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia, Miami, Seattle,
Kansas City, and Memphis, and smaller cities like Reading,
Pennsylvania and Alhambra, California.25 The federal government

21. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963).
22. See infra Subpart I.C.
23. Beth Pearsall, Predictive Policing: The Future of Law Enforcement?,
NAT’L INST. JUST. J., June 2010, at 16, 16 (“Predictive policing, in essence, is
taking data from disparate sources, analyzing them and then using results to
anticipate, prevent and respond more effectively to future crime.”).
24. Id. at 16–17.
25. See, e.g., Chicago Police Department Adopts Predictive Crime-Fighting
Model, GEOGRAPHY & PUB. SAFETY, Mar. 2011, at 14, 14 (2011) (“In April 2010,
the Chicago Police Department began piloting a crime prevention strategy
called predictive analytics.”); Predictive Policing Helps Tennessee Officers
Reduce Violent and Property Crimes, GEOGRAPHY & PUB. SAFETY, Mar. 2011, at
15, 15 (2011) (“Use of a new policing strategy in Memphis, Tennessee, has
helped lower the rate of violent, property, and UCR Part I crimes by an average
of 15.8 percent.”); Nate Berg, Predicting Crime, LAPD-style, GUARDIAN (June 25,
2014, 5:19 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/jun/25/predicting
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has funded pilot programs,26 and large and small companies are
competing for city contracts.27
This section briefly details the history of predictive policing with
a focus on why the purported success of the technology might be
appealing to prosecutors.
In three previous articles, I have
described the full history of predictive policing.28 This section
merely sets the stage for a discussion of how predictive policing
might impact predictive prosecution.
A.

A Brief History of Place-Based Predictive Policing

The national emergence of predictive policing can be traced to
Chief William Bratton’s appointment as Chief of Police of the Los
Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”).29 While the idea had been
percolating before that moment,30 Bratton promoted the idea in
public forums and national media appearances.31 Bratton had been
a long-time believer in data-driven policing, having restructured the
New York Police Department based on data-driven accountability
metrics.32 He brought his faith in data-driven policing to the West

-crime-lapd-los-angeles-police-data-analysis-algorithm-minority-report;
Zen
Vuong, Alhambra Police Chief Says Predictive Policing Has Been
Successful,
PASEDENA
STAR-NEWS
(Feb.
11,
2014,
6:53
PM),
http://www.pasadenastarnews.com/government-and-politics/20140211
/alhambra-police-chief-says-predictive-policing-has-been-successful.
26. See Vince Beiser, Forecasting Felonies: Can Computers Predict Crimes
of the Future?, MILLER-MCCUNE, July–Aug. 2011, at 20, 20, https://psmag.com
/can-computers-predict-crimes-of-the-future-5dd5ecaab617#.o8gsmcvzt
(discussing the influence of National Institute of Justice (“NIJ”) grants).
27. See, e.g., Rachael King, IBM Analytics Help Memphis Cops Get ‘Smart,’
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 5, 2011, 10:30 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2011-12-05/ibm-analytics-help-memphis-cops-get-smart; Juliana Reyes, Philly
Police Will Be First Big City Cops to Use Azavea’s Crime Predicting Software,
TECHNICAL.LY (Nov. 7, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://technical.ly/philly/2013/11/07
/azavea-philly-police-crime-prediction-software.
28. See Ferguson, supra note 7, at 327; Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing
Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. [hereinafter Policing Predictive
Policing] (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 11); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson,
Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 259, 265 (2012).
29. Joel Rubin, Stopping Crime Before It Starts, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2010,
at A1 (“For patrol officers on the streets, mapping software on in-car computers
and hand-held devices would show continuous updates on the probability of
various crimes occurring in the vicinity, along with the addresses and
background information about paroled ex-convicts living in the area.”).
30. See Charlie Beck & Colleen McCue, Predictive Policing: What Can We
Learn from Wal-Mart and Amazon about Fighting Crime in a Recession?,
POLICE CHIEF (Nov. 2009), http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine
/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=1942&issue_id=112009.
31. Former LAPD Chief Predicts the Future of Policing (National Public
Radio broadcast Nov. 26, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/11/26/142795951
/former-lapd-chief-predicts-the-future-of-policing.
32. JAMES J. WILLIS ET AL., COMPSTAT IN PRACTICE: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF
THREE CITIES 1–2 (2003); John Douglass, Tactical Deployment: The Next Great
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Coast and eventually partnered with a group of academics who had
developed algorithms to predict future crimes.33
The algorithmic approach to crime prediction was based on
decades of social science research showing that certain property
crimes encouraged similar crimes in a predictable manner.34 A
burglary in one neighborhood might encourage additional burglaries
in that same neighborhood.35 An auto theft at a particular time in
one area might suggest future thefts in the same area.36 The
reasons for such a “near repeat phenomenon”37 or “boost theory”38
have been debated, but the correlation of additional crime around
the same area has been regularly demonstrated.39 Building off
this
insight
and
adding
lessons
learned
from
environmental criminology,40 hotspot policing,41 and crime

Paradigm Shift in Law Enforcement?, GEOGRAPHY & PUB. SAFETY, Jan. 2009, at
6, 7 n.1 (2009); Eli B. Silverman, With a Hunch and a Punch, 4 J.L. ECON. &
POL’Y 133, 144–45 (2007).
33. See G. O. Mohler et al., Self-Exciting Point Process Modeling of Crime,
106 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 100, 100–04 (2011); Martin B. Short et al., Dissipation
and Displacement of Hotspots in Reaction-Diffusion Models of Crime, 107 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3961, 3961–62 (2010).
34. Kate J. Bowers & Shane D. Johnson, Who Commits Near Repeats? A
Test of the Boost Explanation, W. CRIMINOLOGY REV., Nov. 2004, at 12, 13
(“[R]esearch . . . suggests that the risk of victimisation is communicable, with
the risk of victimisation following an initial burglary not only affecting the
burgled home but, in a similar way to the spread of a communicable disease,
also extending to properties nearby.”).
35. See Jerry H. Ratcliffe & George F. Rengert, Near-Repeat Patterns in
Philadelphia Shootings, 21 SECURITY J. 58, 58 (2008) (“The near-repeat
phenomenon states that if a location is the target of a crime such as burglary,
the homes within a relatively short distance have an increased chance of being
burgled for a limited number of weeks.”).
36. See Josh Koehn, Algorithmic Crimefighting, SANJOSE.COM (Feb. 22,
2012), http://www.sanjose.com/2012/02/22/sheriffs_office_fights_property
_crimes_with_predictive_policing/.
37. Wim Bernasco, Them Again?: Same-Offender Involvement in Repeat
and Near Repeat Burglaries, 5 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 411, 412 (2008); Bowers &
Johnson, supra note 34, at 21.
38. Shane D. Johnson, Repeat Burglary Victimisation: A Tale of Two
Theories, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 215, 216 (2008).
39. Spencer Chainey et al., The Utility of Hotspot Mapping for Predicting
Spatial Patterns of Crime, 21 SECURITY J. 4, 5 (2008) (“Crime also does not occur
randomly. It tends to concentrate at particular places for reasons that can be
explained in relation to victim and offender interaction and the opportunities
that exist to commit crime.”); Shane D. Johnson et al., Space-Time Patterns of
Risk: A Cross National Assessment of Residential Burglary Victimization, 23 J.
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 201, 203–04 (2007).
40. Megan Yerxa, Evaluating the Temporal Parameters of RiskTerrain
Modeling with Residential Burglary, 5 CRIME MAPPING 7, 7, 10–11 (2013)
(discussing environmental criminology).
41. See Leslie W. Kennedy et al., Risk Clusters, Hotspots, and Spatial
Intelligence: Risk Terrain Modeling as an Algorithm for Police Resource
Allocation Strategies, 27 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 339, 358 (2011)
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mapping,42 academic researchers developed place-based predictive
software to predict certain property crimes.43
In practice, police officers might be told to focus attention on
particular geographic areas—usually block-sized, five hundred by
five hundred foot areas—and told to patrol those designated areas
during the free times in their shifts.44 The areas would change daily
depending on crime data.45 The presence of additional police in
targeted areas was meant to deter criminal activity.46 Initial results
showed a reduction in property crime, although longer term trends
remain unclear.47 Criticisms have also been leveled that certain
crime reduction claims cannot be substantiated.48
These initial pilot projects eventually developed into a
commercial business to sell the predictive software. The company,
PredPol, began marketing its services to local police forces.49 Santa
Cruz, California became an early adopter and demonstrated
impressive initial results.50 National press about predictive policing
fueled interest from other cities,51 and PredPol soon boasted a
(“Hotspots policing relies on the identification, primarily through GIS analysis,
of distinct places experiencing crime concentrations.”).
42. See KEITH HARRIES, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, MAPPING CRIME: PRINCIPLE
AND PRACTICE 92 (1999), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178919.pdf; DEREK
J. PAULSEN & MATTHEW B. ROBINSON, CRIME MAPPING AND SPATIAL ASPECTS OF
CRIME 154–55 (2d ed. 2009); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the
Fourth Amendment: Redrawing “High Crime Areas,” 63 HASTINGS L.J. 179,
182–84 (2011).
43. See Beiser, supra note 26, at 20–21.
44. Kalee Thompson, The Santa Cruz Experiment, POPULAR SCI., Nov. 2011,
at 38, 97. The above description uses the PredPol technology and strategy as a
representative example of place-based predictive policing. Other competing
technologies use different methods to forecast risk areas for crime.
45. Id. at 40.
46. Patrick Healy, Predictive Policing Forecasts Crime That Officers Then
Try to Deter, NBC (Jan. 8, 2013, 6:40 AM), http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news
/local/LAPD-Chief-Charlie-Beck-Predictive-Policing-Forecasts-Crime
-185970452.html.
47. See Mike Aldax, Richmond Police Chief Says Department Plans to
Discontinue ‘Predictive Policing’ Software, RICH. STANDARD (June 24, 2015),
http://richmondstandard.com/2015/06/richmond-police-chief-says-department
-plans-to-discontinue-predictive-policing-software/
(quoting
Richmond,
California police Chief Chris Magnus, “In Richmond crime went down, yes, but
now it’s going back up . . . . We’re seeing double digit increases.”); Ben Poston,
L.A. Sees a Broad Increase in Crime, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2015, at A1.
48. Darwin Bond-Graham & Ali Winston, All Tomorrow’s Crimes, S.F.
WKLY., Oct. 30–Nov. 5, 2013, at 11, 12–14.
49. See generally PREDPOL, http://www.predpol.com/ (last visited Aug. 27,
2016) (describing PredPol’s services, technology, and results).
50. Tessa Stuart, Santa Cruz’s Predictive Policing Experiment,
SANTACRUZ.COM (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.santacruz.com/news/santa_cruzs_
predictive_policing_experiment.html; see also Koehn, supra note 36; Thompson,
supra note 44, at 97.
51. Lev Grossman, The 50 Best Inventions of the Year, TIME, Nov. 28, 2011,
at 55, 82.
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national roster of large and mid-size cities as customers.52 Other
companies and technologies joined the quest to be able to predict
place-based property crime, and then violent crime.53 Researchers
at Rutgers–Camden developed Risk Terrain Modeling (“RTM”),54
which looks at environmental factors such as bars, liquor stores, bus
routes, and other urban fixtures to map crime.55 In a recent
national study, RTM demonstrated significant crime reduction
across several jurisdictions.56 HunchLab combines the crime data
focus of PredPol and the environmental focus of RTM and has
developed its own proprietary software for prediction based on
machine-learning technologies.57
Currently, more than half a dozen predictive policing
companies, including large corporations like IBM, Hitachi, and
Motorola, are competing for business.58 These first predictive
technologies have different names and different theories, but share
five commonalities. The technology involves crime data, time,
location, an algorithm, and a theory about why a particular area has
a heightened likelihood of criminal activity.59
Place-based
52. Timothy B. Clark, How Predictive Policing Is Using Algorithms to
Deliver Crime-Reduction Results for Cities, ROUTE FIFTY (Mar. 9, 2015),
http://www.routefifty.com/2015/03/predictive-policing-santa-cruz-predpol
/107013/; Will Frampton, With New Software, Norcross Police Practice
Predictive Policing, CBS ATLANTA (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.cbsatlanta.com
/story/23178208/with-new-software-norcross-police-utilize-predictive-policing.
53. Joel M. Caplan et al., Joint Utility of Event-Dependent and
Environmental Crime Analysis Techniques for Violent Crime Forecasting, 59
CRIME & DELINQ. 243, 243–45, 248 (2013).
54. RISK TERRAIN MODELING, http://www.riskterrainmodeling.com/ (last
visited Aug. 27, 2016).
55. JOEL M. CAPLAN ET AL., RUTGERS CTR. ON PUB. SEC., INTEGRATING
SPATIAL CRIME ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES FOR TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC ACTIONS 3
(2012), http://www.rutgerscps.org/uploads/2/7/3/7/27370595/jointutility
_brief.pdf; Joel M. Caplan, Mapping the Spatial Influence of Crime Correlates: A
Comparison of Operationalization Schemes and Implications for Crime Analysis
and Criminal Justice Practice, 13 CITYSCAPE, no. 3, 2011, at 57, 68; Kennedy et
al., supra note 41, at 343.
56. See Leslie Kennedy et al., A Multi-jurisdictional Test of Risk Terrain
Modeling and a Place-Based Evaluation of Environmental Risk-Based Patrol
Deployment
Strategies,
RUTGERS
CTR.
ON
PUB.
SECURITY,
http://www.rutgerscps.org/uploads/2/7/3/7/27370595/nij6city_resultsexecsum
_final.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2016). As a disclosure, I was an unpaid,
uninvolved consultant on one federal RTM grant. I had no role in developing or
testing the technology.
57. Laura Nahmias & Miranda Neubauer, NYPD Testing Crime-Forecast
Software, POLITICO (July 8, 2015, 5:52 AM), http://www.politico.com/states/new
-york/city-hall/story/2015/07/nypd-testing-crime-forecast-software-090820.
58. See
Maurice
Chammah,
Policing
the
Future,
VERGE,
http://www.theverge.com/2016/2/3/10895804/st-louis-police-hunchlab-predictive
-policing-marshall-project (last visited Aug. 27, 2016); Huet, supra note 1, at 46;
King, supra note 27.
59. See Chainey et al., supra note 39, at 4–5; Dan Turkel, ‘Predictive
Policing’ Tries to Stop Violent Crime Before It Happens, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 25,
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algorithms have been used to target property crimes and violent
crimes.60
Many questions still remain about the application,
effectiveness, and promise of the technology. But, as Commissioner
Bratton stated in 2016, “Predictive policing used to be the future,
and now it is the present.”61
B.

The Development of Person-Based Prediction

Person-based approaches to crime arose independently of
predictive policing (at least as defined by PredPol, RTM, or
HunchLab) and were largely based on a public health model of
targeting crime.62 For decades, sociologists identified the reality
that a small subset of individuals in any community committed the
vast majority of crimes.63 Police recognized that targeting those
individuals could result in a disproportionate reduction of crime
rates.64 For violent crimes, researchers studied shooting victims
and, by tracking their social networks, could identify likely future
victims or criminal actors.65 The theory behind this approach was
that most shootings involve a social network of retaliation between
rival groups (such as gangs, neighborhood crews, and drug dealers)
who respond in relatively predictable ways.66 A shooting of a gang
member would lead to a retaliatory act. That act, in turn, would
continue the cycle of violence.
Professor David Kennedy
demonstrated that by targeting youth violence through a public
health model, police could dramatically curtail shootings.67 Andrew

2015, 8:20 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/predictive-policing-tries-to
-stop-violent-crime-before-it-happens-2015-9.
60. Caplan et al., supra note 53, at 243–45, 248.
61. David Black, Here Comes Predictive Policing: The Next Wave of
Crimefighting Technology is Being Tested in New York City, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Jan. 24, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/david-black
-predictive-policing-article-1.2506580.
62. Anthony A. Braga et al., Problem-Oriented Policing, Deterrence, and
Youth Violence: An Evaluation of Boston’s Operation Ceasefire, 38 J. RES. CRIME
& DELINQ. 195, 195–200 (2001); David M. Kennedy et al., Youth Violence in
Boston: Gun Markets, Serious Youth Offenders, and a Use-Reduction Strategy,
59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 147–49, 156 (1996).
63. See DAVID KENNEDY, DON’T SHOOT: ONE MAN, A STREET FELLOWSHIP, AND
THE END OF VIOLENCE IN INNER-CITY AMERICA 269 (2011); Anthony A. Braga,
Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Strategies and the Prevention of Gun
Homicide, 36 J. CRIM. JUST. 332, 332–34 (2008); Papachristos et al., supra note
12, at 239–42.
64. Davey, supra note 12, at A1; see also Guarino, supra note 12.
65. Andrew V. Papachristos et al., Why Do Criminals Obey the Law? The
Influence of Legitimacy and Social Networks on Active Gun Offenders,102 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 436 (2012).
66. See Heather Mac Donald, Opinion, A Smarter Way to Prosecute, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2014, at A24.
67. David M. Kennedy, Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime
Settings, and A Theory of Prevention, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 449, 449–51 (1997);
Kennedy et al., supra note 62, at 147–49.
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Papachristos, Anthony Braga, and David Hureau investigated
similar social network intervention strategies between rival gangs.68
Other scholars have investigated this same social network
phenomenon.69
Despite arising from a different context, the social network
model has largely been subsumed into the greater predictive
policing discussion because media stories described person-based
predictive techniques under the larger rubric of “predictive policing,”
and because police administrators benefited from the good will (i.e.,
good press) of predictive policing.70 This Essay continues that
blurring of predictive methodologies, but it recognizes that personbased prediction presents different issues than place-based
prediction in terms of liberty, autonomy, and due process.
The best known person-based predictive policing system
involves the Chicago Police Department.
The Chicago Police
Department developed a data-driven process to identify the most
likely offenders of violent crime.71 Entitled the “Heat List,” the
concept is to identify young people who might engage in violence or
be victims of violence and intervene before the violence occurs.72
This identification is conducted by police officers (called District
Intelligence Officers) who evaluate past criminal activity, whether
the target has been identified as part of a gang audit,73 and whether
the target has been placed on the “strategic subjects list” (“SSL”).74
An official Chicago Police Department Special Order S10-05
describes the SSL:
The Strategic Subjects List (SSL) is a rank-order list of
potential victims and subjects with the greatest propensity for
violence. The SSL model looks at individuals with criminal
records who are ranked according to their probability of being
involved in a shooting or murder, either as a victim or an
offender, known as a “Party to Violence” (PTV). The software
is generated based on empirical data that lists attributes of a
person’s criminal record, including the record of violence

68. Andrew V. Papachristos et al., Social Networks and the Risk of Gunshot
Injury, 89 J. URB. HEALTH 992, 993 (2012).
69. Papachristos et al., supra note 12, at 224, 253, 266–67.
70. This is primarily the function of the mass media that has used the
concept of predictive policing and the fear of a Minority Report future as an
attractive news headline. See, e.g., Jack Smith IV, ‘Minority Report’ is Real—
and It’s Really Reporting Minorities, MIC (Nov. 9, 2015), http://mic.com/articles
/127739/minority-reports-predictive-policing-technology-is-really-reporting
-minorities#.zwXVV93jm.
71. Gorner, supra note 12, at 1.
72. Id.
73. See CHI. POLICE DEP’T, CUSTOM NOTIFICATIONS IN CHICAGO, SPECIAL
ORDER S10-05, at III.C (Oct. 6, 2015), http://directives.chicagopolice.org
/directives/.
74. See id. at IV.B.
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among criminal associates, the degree to which his criminal
activities are on the rise, and the types of intensity of criminal
history.75

Once identified and placed on the “Heat List,” a team of police
officers, social workers, and community leaders conduct a “custom
notification” which involves a face-to-face meeting and the delivery
of a custom notification letter.76 This letter details the individual’s
prior contacts with the criminal justice system, as well as potential
future consequences for any continued criminal activity.77 These
custom notification meetings usually involve home visits.78
Essentially, the young person is offered a choice: take advantage of
social services to prevent involvement in future violence or face
additional law enforcement surveillance—and perhaps punitive
consequences.79 Currently, the Chicago Police Department includes
over 1300 names on its Heat List.80
This suspect and social network–focused approach to policing
has—under different names and different programs—been adopted
in Kansas City, Boston, New Orleans, Los Angeles, and other
cities.81 Juvenile courts have also begun to consider implementing
similar identification processes for troubled youth.82 The open
question, however, is how the algorithm scores the criminal record,
connections with associates, and intensity of criminal history,
among other considerations. With few exceptions, the types of
identification mechanisms have not been validated through
scientific methods.83

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Gorner, supra note 12, at 1.
See CHI. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 73, at IV.A, D.
Id. at V.C.
Id. at III.A, B.
Monica Davey, Chicago Police Predict Who May Shoot or Be Shot, N.Y.
TIMES (May 23, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/us/armed-with-data
-chicago-police-try-to-predict-who-may-shoot-or-be-shot.html?_r=0.
81. See, e.g., ANTHONY A. BRAGA ET AL., SMART APPROACHES TO REDUCING
GUN VIOLENCE, at ii–iii (2014), http://www.smartpolicinginitiative.com
/sites/all/files/SPI%20Gun%20Violence%20Spotlight%20FINAL.pdf; Jeffrey
Goldberg, A Matter of Black Lives, ATLANTIC, Sept. 2015, at 70, 73; Los Angeles
Police Using CIA Software to Track Criminals, Ex-cons, RT (Nov. 15, 2014, 3:30
AM), http://rt.com/usa/205727-lapd-criminals-data-collection/; Reducing Murder
Rates, PALANTIR TECHS., https://www.palantir.com/philanthropy-engineering
/annual-report/2015/murder-reduction/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2016).
82. Maya Rao, Police Tool Targets At-Risk Teens, STAR TRIB., Oct. 25, 2014,
at B3; Matt Stroud, Should Los Angeles County Predict Which Children Will
Become Criminals, PAC. STANDARD (Jan. 21, 2016), https://psmag.com/should
-los-angeles-county-predict-which-children-will-become-criminals-ad67f1d217de
#.3tmnq7l2j.
83. For more information, see Policing Predictive Policing, supra note 28.
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Early “Predictive Prosecution” Models

The efficacy of predictive policing remains both alluring and
unproven. Significant research studies have yet to be conducted in
any systemic way.84
Questions remain as crime rates have
fluctuated in cities using the technologies.85 Yet, despite the
unknowns, prosecutor offices have embraced the insight that
predictive analytics and information sharing can identify risk
factors in a community and improve the prosecutorial function.86
The same broad tactical shift toward proactive law enforcement has
thus begun influencing proactive prosecutorial strategies. As the
former head of the Manhattan Criminal Strategies Unit stated, the
change is as much one of philosophy as technology.87 The goal is to
focus on crime, not cases. “Intelligence-driven” prosecutions seek to
take already existing information in prosecution offices, organize it,
manage it, and deploy it to target those most at risk of driving crime
in a community.88
While still in the very early stages, two distinct predictive
prosecution models have been developed. Here I describe them as
the “Enforcer Model” and the “Investigator Model.” Neither, to be
clear, involves pure algorithmic or machine predictions. Just as
predictive policing is more of a risk identification tool than a
predictive guess, so, too, predictive prosecution seeks to proactively
identify risk factors (areas and suspects) in a community and direct
attention to those problems. Predictive prosecution involves datadriven, information-sharing innovations, but not pure algorithmic
judgments about places or people. As will be discussed, some
blending of predictive policing techniques and predictive prosecution
techniques may occur in the future, but currently the prosecution
side has relied on more human rather than algorithmic predictions.
1.

Enforcer Model

The Enforcer Model arises from person-based predictive policing
strategies. In this model, prosecutors play a role of enforcing
warnings made to those predicted to be involved in criminal activity
(especially violence). In some cases, this prosecutorial enforcement
might be indirect, but in other cases, the prosecutors might directly

84. See generally id. (discussing the state of objective, peer-review testing of
the technologies).
85. Huet, supra note 1, at 46 (“It’s impossible to know if PredPol prevents
crime, since crime rates fluctuate, or to know the details of the software’s blackbox algorithm, but budget-strapped police chiefs don’t care.”).
86. See Mac Donald, supra note 66, at A24.
87. Telephone Interview with David O’Keefe & Kerry Chicon, Manhattan
Dist. Attorney’s Office (Mar. 30, 2016).
88. The Manhattan District Attorney’s Office and others have adopted the
terminology “intelligence-driven prosecution” as opposed to predictive
prosecution. See Fox, supra note 15.
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and personally provide verbal notice of harsher enforcement
penalties.
For example, the Special Order detailing the process of custom
notification in Chicago makes explicit reference to prosecutorial
involvement.89 The Special Order provides that when someone
identified on the Heat List is rearrested, the police will recommend
the highest possible charges to prosecutors, encourage community
advocacy against bond release, and engage in direct coordination
with state prosecutors’ offices.90 Section V.D reads in full:
When a recipient of the custom notification engages in
criminal activity for which he or she is arrested, the district
commander will ensure:
1. [N]otification to and coordination with the appropriate
Bureau of Detectives Area to ensure appropriate charging
occurs. The highest possible charges will be pursued for any
individual in the VRS Custom Notification Program.
2. Court advocacy volunteers are notified of the date, time, and
place of the bond hearing or other court hearings and
encourage attendance at the hearing to demonstrate the
community’s support in decreasing the violence.
3. [C]oordination with the Cook County’s State’s Attorney
Community Justice Center Unit as appropriate.91

Prosecutors are, thus, directly influenced by a suspect’s placement
on the Heat List.
The Custom Notification Letters themselves “include a
description of both federal and state sentencing options”92
demonstrating how prosecutorial decisions will be impacted by this
designation.
In fact, in the definitions section, the Custom
Notification Letter is defined as an information tool to make
suspects aware of enhanced prosecution possibilities:
The Custom Notification Letter will be used to inform
individuals of the arrest, prosecution, and sentencing
consequences they may face if they choose to or continue to
engage in public violence. The letter will be specific to the
identified individual and incorporate those factors known
about the individual inclusive of prior arrests, impact of known
associates, and potential sentencing outcomes for future
criminal acts.93

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See CHI. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 73, at V.D.
Id.
Id.
Id. at IV.A.
Id. at IV.D (emphasis added).
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The procedures and policy behind custom notification, thus,
encourage prosecutors to follow through on the charging, bond, and
sentencing warnings provided in the custom notification letters.
Prosecutors play a more direct enforcer role in other gang
violence reduction strategies.94 One strategy that has been adopted
by law enforcement is called “focused deterrence.”95
Focused
deterrence involves a targeted message to a small percentage of the
population that prosecutors, police, and community members know
who is engaged in violence and that they are committed to stopping
it.96
For example, Chicago has developed a broad Gang Violence
Reduction Strategy that identifies gang members through “gang
audits” and the SSL.97 Identified targets are then invited to “call-in”
meetings with prosecutors, police, and community members. For
example, if a young man is identified through a gang audit, the SSL,
or some other targeting measure,98 and asked to participate in a
community forum, it is not uncommon for a prosecutor to be
present.99 These call-in meetings serve as a “scared straight”
warning for individuals placed on the Heat List.100 The prosecutor
symbolically and sometimes literally describes the consequences for
failing to heed the warning to stay away from crime. As described
by Andrew Papachristos and David Kirk:
A federal partner, typically from the U.S. Attorney’s Office,
explains how federal statutes might be leveraged against the
faction, including continued criminal enterprise and armed
career criminal statutes. The point of this message stresses
the deterrent aspect of the program. Representatives from
local police and prosecutors provide examples of recent cases
and shootings to underscore the reach of the current violence
94. See Heather Mac Donald, Prosecution Gets Smart, CITY J. (2014),
http://www.city-journal.org/2014/24_3_intelligence-driven-crime-fighting.html.
95. See Andrew V. Papachristos & David S. Kirk, Changing the Street
Dynamic: Evaluating Chicago’s Group Violence Reduction Strategy, 14
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 525, 533 (2015) (“[F]ocused deterrence posits that
crime reduction is best achieved by concentrating deterrence efforts on those
groups or individuals involved directly in the targeted type of crime.”).
96. Id. at 533–34.
97. CHI. POLICE DEP’T, CUSTOM NOTIFICATIONS IN CHICAGO, GENERAL ORDER
G10-01, at IV.A (Dec. 31, 2015), http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/
(“The cornerstone of the Gang Violence Reduction Strategy is the Gang Audit.”).
98. See id. at V.A, B (discussing The Gang Intervention Probation Program
(“GIPP”) and the Targeted Repeat Offender and Apprehension and Prosecution
(“TRAP”) Program).
99. See Papachristos & Kirk, supra note 95, at 536.
100. John Eligon & Timothy Williams, On Police Radar for Crimes They
Might Commit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2015, at A1 (“Call-ins are central to the
program. The authorities invite about 120 of the group leaders they have
identified (25 to 40 usually show up) to hear from a range of officials, including
the local and federal prosecutors, the police chief and the mayor.”).
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and how they are working in a coordinated fashion with others
in the room.101

The message is made clear by prosecutors: if you violate the law
again, you will be punished harder because you have been warned.
One U.S. Attorney referenced a fifteen-year sentence for a single
bullet for someone who had not heeded the warnings.102 The point
was made clear that those predicted to be at higher risk for crime
had better turn their lives around or face additional sanction by
prosecuting authorities.103
As described above, prosecutors, as enforcers for predictive
policing techniques, remain in a fairly typical prosecutorial role with
one exception: the enforcement threats are influenced by predictive
data. Clearly, prosecutors have long held community meetings.
Prosecutors have long held “scared straight” talks in community
forums.104 Prosecutors have long stood arm in arm with police to
send a message that criminality will not be tolerated. The difference
here is that the targets of the community forum, and thus the
subjects of harsher punishment, were originally identified by
predictive policing techniques and other data-driven mechanisms. If
those algorithmic or social network correlations are in error, then
the subsequent harsher punishment may be unjustified. Evidence is
very clear that arrest records are filled with mistakes.105 Similar

101. See Papachristos & Kirk, supra note 95, at 536.
102. Eligon & Williams, supra note 100, at A17 (“Tammy Dickinson, the
United States Attorney for the Western District of Missouri, related the story of
a man in the program who was given a 15-year prison sentence for being caught
with a bullet in his pocket.”).
103. To Stem Gun Crime, ‘Moneyball,’ ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 28,
2015, at A20 (quoting Circuit Attorney Jennifer Joyce: “‘Here are the rules. The
first group that commits a homicide, the first body that drops, we’re coming
after you and your friends. The group that does the most violence, we’re coming
after you.’ Probation may be revoked, major and minor crimes will be
prosecuted and so will minor ordinance violations, building code violations and
civil issues like failure to pay child support.”).
104. Maureen Fan, Steering Youth Straight Sound Counsel From Mentor
Cops, Prosecutors and Judges, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 18, 1997, 12:00 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/boroughs/steering-youth-straight-sound
-counsel-mentor-cops-prosecutors-judges-article-1.760985.
105. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S REPORT ON CRIMINAL HISTORY BACKGROUND CHECKS 3 (2006),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ag_bgchecks_report.pdf; Robert Faturechi &
Jack Leonard, ID Errors Put Hundreds in County Jail, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 25,
2011, at A1 (stating that more than 1480 people have been mistakenly arrested
over five year period); Amanda Simon, Garbage In, Unnecessary Arrests Follow,
DAILY KOS (Apr. 26, 2010, 12:20 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speakeasy
/garbage-unnecessary-arrests-follow; see also Briana Duggan, The Rap-Sheet
Trap: One Man vs. a Multitude of Errors, CITY LIMITS (Mar. 3, 2015),
http://citylimits.org/2015/03/03/the-rap-sheet-trap-one-man-vs-a-multitude-of
-errors/#.
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problems exist with gang databases106 and offender registries.107 If
those “Heat Lists” are found to be flawed, then not only police
surveillance, but prosecutorial judgment becomes distorted.
The Chicago Tribune interviewed a young man, Robert
McDaniel, whose name appeared on the Heat List because a friend
of his had been shot.108 Mr. McDaniel’s prior record consisted of a
single misdemeanor conviction and a few minor arrests.109 But, by
being placed on the list, Mr. McDaniel was now associated with the
worst of the worst. An enhanced sentence predicated in part on a
connection to a Heat List that later turns out to be unwarranted
would be a real unfairness to someone like Mr. McDaniel. If the
prosecutor does not take on an independent duty to double check the
data, then the harm from such a prediction could be significant.110
Prosecutors who are enforcing predictive policing or social
network models depend on the accuracy of those models for
guidance. As will be discussed in Part II, this enforcement role
offers benefits and risks in its real world application.
2.

Investigator Model

The Investigator Model of predictive prosecution involves a
more organic prosecutor-led information-sharing system. Such a
system, like the Crime Strategies Units being developed in
Manhattan, San Francisco, Philadelphia, and Baton Rouge,111 is
data driven and targets identifiable criminal actors.112 These
systems are not based on algorithmic judgments, but on data of
actual crime patterns in a city.113 Using data, prosecutors identify
geographic areas of concern based on reported shootings, thefts, or
106. K. Babe Howell, Gang Policing: The Post-Stop-and-Frisk Justification
for Profile-Based Policing, 5 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2015); Joshua D.
Wright, The Constitutional Failure of Gang Databases, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L.
115, 122–23 (2005).
107. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 155 (2009) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“Inaccuracies in expansive, interconnected collections of electronic
information raise grave concerns for individual liberty.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
REVIEW OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEX OFFENDER
REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION ACT, at iii (2008), https://oig.justice.gov
/reports/plus/e0901/final.pdf (noting widespread inaccuracies in state registry
information); see, e.g., Fredrick Kunkle, Caught in a Neighborhood Web:
Innocent Man Mistaken for Registered Offender, WASH. POST, May 13, 2006, at
A1.
108. Gorner, supra note 12, at 1.
109. Id.
110. See Mac Donald, supra note 66, at A24.
111. Id. (“Prosecutors in Richmond, Va., and Rockland County, N.Y., as well
as San Francisco and Philadelphia, are building intelligence systems to drive
crime down.”); New Baton Rouge Crime Strategies Unit Announced, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/usao-mdla/new-baton-rouge-crime-strategies
-unit-announced (last visited Aug. 27, 2016).
112. Brown, supra note 17, at 24; Mac Donald, supra note 66, at A24.
113. Brown, supra note 17, at 24.
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particular types of crime.114 Suspects are identified as being
engaged in violence or gang activity based on past criminal
activity.115 These individuals are monitored through social media
and traditional law enforcement surveillance.116 The predicted
targets are then prosecuted using available prosecutorial leverage to
extract enhanced pleas or sentences from those identified.117
In general, this type of intelligence-driven prosecution involves
five
modifications
from
the
traditional
police-prosecutor
relationship.
First, prosecutors identify geographical areas of
concern based on reported crime patterns in a city.118 The focus is
again on crime, not cases, meaning even unsolved crimes also
capture the attention of prosecutors. Second, prosecutors identify
individuals who are considered the crime drivers in a community
and include them in an “arrest alert system.”119 These individuals
become the “primary targets” of prosecution, under the theory that
by removing these violent actors, overall violence levels will fall.120
As will be discussed, the arrest alert system triggers heightened
attention for a prosecutor to incapacitate these predicted bad actors
through existing legal mechanisms. Third, less traditional data
points enter into the calculation of whom to target. Social media
posts, a past lack of cooperation with police, status as a victim of
violence, and other less formal bits of information are included in
the risk assessments of whom to target.121 Fourth, the information
sharing between police and prosecutors is prioritized and
strengthened.122 Intelligence-driven prosecution is not just about
being smarter, but developing actionable intelligence about crime
patterns in an area. Finally, all of this information about past
criminal activities is memorialized in a searchable dataset for future
action.123
As one example, the Crime Strategies Unit in Manhattan has
developed a new information-sharing system to proactively identify
the “most wanted” of New York’s criminal actors.124
These
individuals have significant past criminal records, but the data
114. Id. at 24–25.
115. Id. at 24; Mac Donald, supra note 66, at A24.
116. See Mac Donald, supra note 66, at A24.
117. See Brown, supra note 17, at 28–29.
118. Id. at 24–25.
119. See Mac Donald, supra note 66, at A24.
120. Id.
121. Brown, supra note 17, at 25; Mac Donald, supra note 66, at A24.
122. See Mac Donald, supra note 66, at A24; James C. McKinley, Jr., In
Unusual Collaboration, Police and Prosecutors Team Up to Reduce Crime, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 2014, at A25.
123. Brown, supra note 17, at 24–25.
124. Mac Donald, supra note 94 (“Based on daily communication with local
police commanders and precinct field-intelligence officers, the Crime Strategies
Unit has compiled a database of Manhattan’s most significant criminal players
and other persons of interest (such as elusive or uncooperative witnesses).”).
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focuses on future criminal risk. The logic being that past instigators
of criminal activity are at greater risk to be the future drivers of
crime. This database of approximately nine thousand names has
become critical to several major prosecutions.125
In essence,
prosecutors have predicted that incapacitating these criminal actors
will lead to an overall reduction in crime. As explained by David
O’Keefe, the past Head of the Manhattan District Attorney’s Crime
Strategies Unit (“CSU”), “Working with our partners in the
precincts, we also identified hot spots and the names of the people
committing the most crimes in each area. The question became,
what can we do to incapacitate these people?”126
This focus on incapacitating “primary targets” has significant
practical effects on traditional prosecution practices. Routinely now,
if someone listed in the CSU arrest alert system is arrested, even for
a low-level offense, the full power of the prosecutors’ office is
directed against them.127 This means that ordinary arrests may
result in extraordinary outcomes where those marked as predicted
troublemakers are punished to the full extent of the law.128
125. See Brown, supra note 17, at 24 (“They asked police commanders to
submit a list of each precinct’s 25 worst offenders—so-called crime drivers,
whose ‘incapacitation by the criminal-justice system would have a positive
impact on the community’s safety. Seeded with these initial cases, the C.S.U.
built a searchable database that now includes more than 9,000 chronic
offenders, virtually all of whom have criminal records.’”); Mac Donald, supra
note 94 (“In 2012, police arrested a leading gang member in East Harlem for
running toward people in a brawl brandishing a metal lock tied into a
bandanna. The defendant had been shot in the past and had also likely
witnessed a homicide, without cooperating with police after either crime. The
attempted assault would ordinarily have gone nowhere, had the CSU not
closely tracked the assailant. Instead, the prosecutor indicted him for criminal
possession of a weapon in the third degree—a felony charge. After the charges
were read, the defendant absconded while on bail. Arrested a second time on
the open warrant, he was eventually sentenced to two to four years in prison on
the weapon charge and two to four years on the bail-jump charge—outcomes
that would have been unthinkable but for the information that the CSU had
developed.”).
126. Fox, supra note 15.
127. Brown, supra note 17, at 24 (“When someone in the Arrest Alert System
is picked up, even on a minor charge or a parole violation, or is arrested in
another borough, any interested prosecutor is automatically pinged with a
detailed email.”). While the final decision will be determined based on the
particular facts of the individual and the case, and would remain within the
broad grant of discretion given to prosecutors, the influence of the arrest alert
system is significant.
128. Mac Donald, supra note 66, at A24 (“The unit has compiled a database
of Manhattan’s most significant criminal players—now numbering about
9,000—whose arrest anywhere in the city immediately triggers an alert to one
of the Crime Strategies Unit attorneys. The attorney will then contact the local
prosecutor who has been assigned the case—whether in Manhattan or another
borough—to make sure the defendant is prosecuted to the full extent of the law
rather than slipping through the cracks.”); McKinley, Jr., supra note 122, at
A25 (“The unit assembled what amounts to a list of prioritized targets for
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The Investigator Model of predictive prosecution, thus,
influences several aspects of the traditional prosecution process.
First, the targeting system impacts bail decisions, as prosecutors
might be instructed to ask for higher bail for those identified in the
arrest alert system.129
Before the arrest occurs, CSU drafts
particularized bail applications on predicted individuals advocating
for strict bail positions.130 Second, targeted individuals could face
enhanced criminal charges in order to maximize prosecutorial
leverage.131 This means that prosecutors would be instructed to
seek the maximum charges justified under law.132 These initial
charging decisions obviously impact later plea deals and impede
plea negotiations as defendants face much harsher potential
punishments.133 Sentencing decisions can also be ratcheted up as
prosecutors seek to ensure the maximum penalty possible.134
Maximum sentences on minor crimes result in extended
incarceration. Even after convictions and sentencing, prosecutors
have been known to weigh in on parole decisions and requirements
of release.135
Beyond direct prosecution, CSU also impacts how uncooperative
witnesses may be handled.136 Whereas in the ordinary course, an

prosecution in each precinct. When people on the list are arrested, even for
minor crimes, prosecutors receive an electronic alert.”).
129. See Mac Donald, supra note 66, at A24 (“The arrest alert system
recognizes that a defendant’s official history of arrests and convictions may fail
to convey his position in the criminal food chain. A 16-year-old gang member
may be responsible for numerous shootings, as attested to by his and others’
Facebook pages, but never arrested for any of them because his victims and
witnesses refused to cooperate with the police. If he is nabbed for shoplifting,
the misdemeanor prosecutor will have a few minutes at most to decide whether
to pursue the case. Seeing simply a petty criminal, the charging attorney might
well let him walk free. But if that attorney is armed with intelligence gathered
on the suspect, he can seek the maximum charge and argue to the judge for
high bail.”); Fox, supra note 15 (“It can help us prepare a bail application in
advance, or help us plan the strategy to enable an arrest.”).
130. See McKinley, Jr., supra note 122, at A25 (“Bail application letters
detailing the defendant’s history of other crimes have been prepared in advance,
and at the arraignment, the prosecutor regularly pushes for higher bail and
sometimes brings a more serious charge, if it can be justified by the evidence.”).
131. See Mac Donald, supra note 94.
132. See McKinley, Jr., supra note 122, at A25 (“The office’s strategy has
been to pursue people believed to be drivers of crime, using whatever felony
charge prosecutors can prove and seeking the maximum penalty.”).
133. See Fox, supra note 15 (“This system has all sorts of useful
applications. It can help shape the plea offers made to the court.”).
134. See Gorner, supra note 12, at 6.
135. See Fox, supra note 15 (“We also have a great relationship with parole.
It’s all about using levers of influence. For example, if we have someone on our
target list who’s about to come out of prison, we can go to parole and ask if
they’re willing to put special conditions on the defendant.”).
136. Id. (“It can also help us gain cooperation among crime victims, who are
often reluctant to testify. If that person is arrested on another offense, the ADA
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uncooperative witness might enter and rapidly leave the criminal
justice system on a minor charge, now prosecutors will be alerted to
the witnesses’ arrest and legal predicament.137 As one of the Chief
Prosecutors in Manhattan explained in a news article on the CSU:
Every morning, I talk to my five A.D.A.s, who are experts in
their areas. We decide whom we should try to pull out for a
debriefing. . . . We pull people arrested on low-level
misdemeanor charges, maybe two or three a week. We read
them their Miranda rights. About 80 percent of them will
talk.138

These debriefings are not unusual or unethical, but the new alert
system makes the ability of prosecutors to locate witnesses much
easier. The simple truth is that additional leverage can make
initially uncooperative witnesses more cooperative.139
The Crime Strategies Unit also provides additional information
about crime patterns and criminal activities in localized geographic
areas.140
Prosecutors create intelligence reports on criminal
hotspots, develop a violence timeline of crimes, and identify the
primary violent actors, gangs, and community stakeholders in each
location.141 Police have begun tracking social media posts of some of
the targeted individuals.142 This social media focus has proven quite
valuable in mapping out the social networks of gang activity in New
York.143 Detectives and prosecutors can now visualize the social
relationships of gangs and communities in ways that explain and

will get a notification and it might become a factor in encouraging him or her to
agree to help out on the case.”).
137. See id.
138. Brown, supra note 17, at 25.
139. See Fox, supra note 15 (“It can also help us gain cooperation among
crime victims, who are often reluctant to testify.”).
140. See John Eligon, Top Prosecutor Creates a Unit on Crime Trends, N.Y.
TIMES, May 25, 2010, at A22 (“The Crime Strategies Unit will rely on a
computer database developed by the district attorney’s office to allow
prosecutors to draw parallels among cases, unearth crime patterns in particular
areas and make more informed decisions on how to handle defendants . . . .”);
Mac Donald, supra note 94 (“[DA Cyrus] Vance then created a new entity called
the Crime Strategies Unit, the sole purpose of which is to gather and deploy
intelligence on Manhattan’s crime patterns and serious offenders.”).
141. See Brown, supra note 17, at 25; Fox, supra note 15 (“[W]e also
identified hot spots and the names of the people committing the most crimes in
each area.”).
142. Mac Donald, supra note 94 (“The Crime Strategies Unit has been as
quick as the NYPD to spot the crime-fighting usefulness of social media. Crime
analysts in the unit constantly track the Internet footprints of suspects in the
arrest-alert database.
The indictments in the 2013 East Harlem gang
conspiracy case, for instance, consist almost exclusively of the Facebook
postings of the defendants, as well as recordings of their phone calls whenever
they were confined at Rikers.”).
143. Id.
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predict tension, shootings, or other violence.144 Threats on social
media can help forecast the next shooting.
Prosecutors, in
collaboration with the police, have begun using traditional
surveillance techniques (such as video cameras) to augment their
monitoring of predicted criminals.145 Facial recognition software
linked to social media has led to the identification of suspects and
witnesses.146 Targets are not only mapped by their relationships,
but actually tracked as they go through the criminal justice system
from arrest through post-parole release.147 Prosecutors, not just
police, have gained access to traditionally investigative, as opposed
to adjudicatory. tools.148
The result is a new type of prosecutor-police relationship that
blurs traditional lines.149 Prosecutors are focusing on futureoriented, intelligence-driven prosecutions.150 Police are following
suit. As reported by the New York Times, the CSU prosecutorial
data system is intended to augment joint police-prosecution
investigations:
As part of a template for relations between the two agencies,
the district attorney’s office will provide the police with more

144. See id. (“The prosecutors and police investigators had scanned more
than a million social media pages to map out the web of criminality among the
defendants . . . .”).
145. See id. (“The Crime Strategies Unit will gain access to more of the
police department’s databases on suspects and to its network of security
cameras, while police detectives will receive the granular intelligence about
criminal conspiracies developed during trial preparation.”).
146. See, e.g., BERNARD MARR, BIG DATA: USING SMART BIG DATA ANALYTICS
AND METRICS TO MAKE BETTER DECISIONS AND IMPROVE PERFORMANCE 130 (2015)
(concerning the use of facial recognition software in the UK, “[V]ideo footage is
now routinely used to create a 3D faceprint of a suspect which is then used to
compare to images available on the Internet or social media sites.”).
147. Eligon & Williams, supra note 100, at A17; Mac Donald, supra note 94.
148. McKinley, Jr., supra note 122, at A25 (“Prosecutors will have access, for
instance, to the network of security cameras on city streets the department uses
to solve crimes, as well as the mountains of data collected on police reports,
while detectives will receive the granular intelligence about criminal
conspiracies gathered by prosecutors as they prepare for trial.”).
149. Mac Donald, supra note 94 (“Vital information about offender networks
gleaned in the course of preparing a case for trial usually remains on a
prosecutor’s legal pad, rarely conveyed back to the police or shared with other
prosecutors.”).
150. Brown, supra note 17, at 24 (quoting Cyrus Vance: “I wanted to develop
what I call intelligence-driven prosecution.”); Conor Skelding, Cy Vance on ‘21st
Century
Crime-Fighting’,
POLITICO
(June
10,
2014,
11:45
AM),
http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/city-hall/2014/06/8546853/cy-vance-21st
-century-crime-fighting (quoting Cyrus Vance Jr.: “‘Like CompStat, the Crime
Strategies Unit identifies the crime-drivers and crime hotspots,’ he said. ‘But
that’s just the beginning. C.S.U. collects, connects, and analyzes that, and
other data, from seemingly unrelated cases. It makes sense of the enormous
data that comes into our office and creates actionable intelligence.’”).
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than $20 million from drug forfeiture cases to pay for new
technology. That money will go for security cameras, fiberoptic information systems and hand-held tablets that will feed
police officers data about suspects, Mr. Bratton said. The
Police Department, in turn, will provide the district attorney’s
Crime Strategies Unit access to more of the data it collects not
only on reported crimes but also on suspects, Mr. Bratton said.
He called the new approach “extreme collaboration” and
illustrated it by clasping his hands together.151

This process signifies a realignment to a more proactive method of
prosecution152 and one that encourages what Commissioner Bratton
called a “seamless web” of information between prosecutors and the
police.153
Before moving on to discuss the future of predictive prosecution,
it must be made clear that much of what is being proposed is not
fundamentally all that new. Police and prosecutors have long kept
detailed dossiers on potential suspects.154 As Wayne Logan and I
have written about, our current data-driven criminal justice system
has roots in 18th century innovations.155 Data in the form of arrest
logs, arrest warrants, offender registries, biometrics, and a host of
court and community supervision records has long been available to
police.156 Further, police have recognized the need to identify and
target potential “bad apples” since before there were police forces.157
This information has regularly been shared with prosecutors who
have built similarly extensive investigative files on potential
offenders.158 Predictive prosecution is merely an innovative way to
identify and predict likely targets through the use of better datasharing technologies.
151. McKinley, Jr., supra note 122, at A25. This development has not yet
occurred, as prosecutors are not yet adding information to police hand-held
tablets or police databases.
152. See Fox, supra note 15 (“The Arrest Alert system has started to
revolutionize the way cases are handled; I call it the “central nervous system”
for intelligence-driven prosecution. . . . If a prosecutor has a case they’re
working on, they can add names of persons of interest to the list and they will
get an alert in the form of an email if that person is arrested anywhere in New
York City. Before arrest alerts, prosecutors would likely have no idea if the
person they were prosecuting had been arrested again while the case was
active, particularly if the arrest happened outside of Manhattan. The arrest
alert system has allowed us to break out of a reactive approach to prosecution to
one that is focused on coordination and proactive measures.”).
153. Mac Donald, supra note 94 (“Bratton wants a “seamless web” of
information between the prosecutors and the police, he told the New York Times
in early June.”).
154. Wayne A. Logan, Policing Identity, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1561, 1561 (2012).
155. Logan & Ferguson, supra note 7.
156. Id.
157. Logan, supra note 154, at 1564–66.
158. See generally id. (describing how, over time, governments sought more
systematic means of identification for community members and felons alike).
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Nevertheless, the impact of predictive analytics and social
network technology on law enforcement and prosecution is real and
needs to be examined. Predictive policing has gained a foothold in
police administration. Predictive prosecution is only a few years
behind. And so, the promise and perils need to be addressed as the
technology and methodologies develop. The next section looks at
three big questions facing predictive prosecution.
II. PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS ABOUT PREDICTIVE PROSECUTION
Predictive prosecution holds real promise for prosecutors’ offices
seeking to focus resources on those individuals thought to present
the greatest risk to society. By prioritizing those identified to be
most at risk, prosecutors—at least in theory—can utilize existing
discretionary power in a manner that is more efficient, proactive,
cheaper, and smarter.
As this is a symposium devoted to
Implementing De-Incarceration Strategies: Policies and Practices to
Reduce Crime and Mass Incarceration, such an innovation deserves
a serious look. At the same time, hard questions must be asked of
this new method of prosecution. What are the impacts, distortions,
or concerns?
This section examines three big questions surrounding
predictive prosecution.
First, how does predictive prosecution
impact prosecutorial decision-making? Second, how does predictive
prosecution impact prosecutorial role?
And third, how will
predictive prosecution impact crime suppression strategies? Due to
the constraints of the symposium-essay format, the ideas discussed
are initial impressions, not full explorations of complex and
important topics.
A.

Predictive Prosecution and Prosecutorial Decision-making

Predictive prosecution offers potential benefits in terms of
prioritization, efficiency, and more informed judgments. Prosecutors
must make difficult decisions every day, and more information
might provide for better choices.
In today’s legal system,
prosecutors possess almost unlimited discretion.159 Prosecutors
159. Ellen S. Podgor, Race-ing Prosecutors’ Ethics Codes, 44 HARV. C.R.–C.L.
L. REV. 461, 462 (2009) (“Prosecutorial discretion is an accepted component of
our criminal justice system.”). See generally ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY
JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 148 (2007) (“As one former
prosecutor stated, ‘[a] prosecutor’s power to damage or destroy anyone he
chooses to indict is virtually limitless.’”); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good
Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial
Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 900 (1995) (describing prosecutorial
misconduct because of the lack of discipline coming from regulatory entities);
Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discretionary
Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511 (2000) (discussing the duties of prosecutors
in making discretionary decisions and the implications resulting from those
decisions).
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decide whom to prosecute.160 Prosecutors decide how to charge and
how to structure plea bargains.161
And prosecutors decide
recommendations for sentences.162 Adding information from sources
such as the predictive policing Heat List or organically developed
intelligence does not present any direct ethical or constitutional
concerns.163
If used to identify and proactively target actual crime drivers in
a community, a predictive prosecution system could well provide an
overall benefit to society. If resources could be redirected toward
incapacitating more serious offenders (through bail, charging, and
sentencing decisions), while concomitantly incapacitating fewer, less
serious offenders, such a process could mean fewer overall people in
jail. Such a system might also be more efficient, redirecting scarce
prosecution resources. Of course, the current system of mass
incarceration that has developed over the last several decades has
not lacked for efficiencies in prosecuting and convicting
defendants.164 Mandatory minimums, harsh drug sentences, plea
bargains, and other processing efficiencies have created an overly
efficient process for incarcerating millions of people.165 But, the web

160. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“In our criminal
justice system, the Government retains ‘broad discretion’ as to whom to
prosecute.”); see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996);
United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123–24 (1979); Bodenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1978).
161. Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining With PleaBased Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1254–56 (2008); Harry Litman, Pretextual
Prosecution, 92 GEO. L.J. 1135, 1137 n.4 (2004); Podgor, supra note 159, at 463
(“The power of prosecutorial discretion can be seen when prosecutors
deliberately overcharge to obtain a desirable plea agreement. Likewise, there
are ample examples of ‘pretextual’ prosecutions on extraneous charges when
prosecutors believe the accused individuals are inherently evil.”).
162. Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259,
272–74 (2001) (discussing the ethics of prosecutorial sentencing).
163. Prosecutors are guided by ABA Ethics guidelines and other codes of
professional conduct. ABA Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(a) prohibits
charges that are “not supported by probable cause.” See MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2012). American Bar Association
Standards for Criminal Justice Prosecution Function and Defense Function
states prosecutors “should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the
continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible
evidence to support a conviction.” See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 33.9(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993).
164. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 40–57 (2010). Intriguingly, for a symposium on mass
incarceration, New York State has seen both a huge drop in crime and a
significant drop in its prison population. See Inimai M. Chettiar, The Many
Causes of America’s Decline in Crime, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 11, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/02/the-many-causes-of
-american-decline-in-crime/385364/ .
165. Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J.
423, 428–431 (2013).
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of people caught up in this system has been overbroad, lacking a
commitment to prioritize those most dangerous to society.166
Millions of nonviolent offenders, millions of misdemeanants, and
millions of low-level figures in the drug world are serving significant
time in jail.167 Individually, those persons might not be the chosen
targets of our criminal justice resources, but systemically
prosecutors have had few mechanisms to evaluate or rank relative
danger or risk to society.168
Predictive prosecution offers a potential smart-on-crime
counterweight to the tough-on-crime practices of over-incarceration.
In fact, taken one step further, if prosecutors only sought to target
those predicted to be of high risk of committing crime, then a huge
majority of people would see reduced bail, better pleas, and more
lenient sentencing. Such prioritization might significantly reduce
pretrial detention costs, long term sentencing costs, and overall
criminal justice costs.
The danger, of course, is that predictive prosecution might not
reduce prosecution levels, but might, in fact, bring more people into
the criminal justice system. Two obvious concerns arise within the
Enforcer Model. First, in the Enforcer Model individuals are being
linked to criminal activity by proxies for criminal activity. A gang
member who has a friend who was shot may be added to the system
because, statistically, the associates of dead gang members are more
likely to themselves be involved in gun violence.169 The “two degrees
of separation” analysis may both be accurate170 and yet overbroad
when it comes to prosecutorial decisions. The particular individual
might not have done anything but be a victim of violence, or might
remain a small time criminal actor. Further, that particular
individual might be summoned to a call-in by a prosecutor and
threatened that he may face harsher detention, charging, and
sentencing decisions should he get in trouble in the future. So, that
individual is in the first instance added to a prosecution list without
166. John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1239, 1242–55 (2012); Leon Neyfakh, Why Are So Many Americans in
Prison?
A
Provocative
New
Theory,
SLATE
(Feb.
6,
2015,
6:30 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2015/02/mass
_incarceration_a_provocative_new_theory_for_why_so_many_americans
_are.html.
167. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1320
(2012).
168. See, e.g., Neyfakh, supra note 166 (describing how policymakers have
influenced prosecutors’ decisions relating to drug offenses, regardless of the risk
of danger the drug possessors pose to society).
169. See Papachristos & Kirk, supra note 95, at 528–29 (describing how
“research found that simply being in such networks exponentially increases the
likelihood that one becomes a victim of a gunshot injury; in the Chicago study,
for instance, being in a network with another gunshot victim increases the
probability of being a victim a staggering 900%.”); Gorner, supra note 12, at 6.
170. See Papachristos & Kirk, supra note 95, at 528–29.
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criminal activity of his own, and in the second instance faced with
the potential for a harsher criminal justice outcome because of that
designation.
Similarly, in the “Investigative Model,” individuals are being
targeted because they have been identified as the primary targets
for removal.171 The key, of course, is the process by which people are
targeted.
If limited to only those individuals with multiple
convictions for violence, this incapacitation approach can be
defended. Using minor crimes to incapacitate major criminal actors
is aggressive, but defensible. However, if other factors such as a
lack of cooperation with police, suspected but unproven violence, or
low-level, non-violent crimes become the justification for being a
target, then justification for aggressive incapacitation weakens.
Using minor crimes to incapacitate minor criminal actors undercuts
the value of targeting only the serious offenders.
Put another way, because the targeting mechanism of
identifying the primary targets rests with the prosecution (in
collaboration with police), and because there is no system to
challenge or correct a targeting error, a risk arises about the data
populating this system. Prosecutorial decision-making runs a real
risk of being infected by bad data in these systems.172 Personal bias
could influence who becomes a target.
Political or economic
pressure could shape the types of crimes addressed.
Even more generally, any data-driven system runs into
concerns with data quality. Data can be inaccurate.173 Data can be
biased.174 Data can reify the existing socio-economic inequalities in

171. See supra Subpart I.C.2.
172. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 155 (2009) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“The risk of error stemming from these databases is not slim.
Herring’s amici warn that law enforcement databases are insufficiently
monitored and often out of date. Government reports describe, for example,
flaws in NCIC databases, terrorist watchlist databases, and databases
associated with the Federal Government’s employment eligibility verification
system.” (footnotes and citation omitted)).
173. See, e.g., Mary De Ming Fan, Reforming the Criminal Rap Sheet:
Federal Timidity and the Traditional State Functions Doctrine, 33 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 31, 60 (2005) (describing errors in rap sheets); Shaudee Navid, They’re
Making a List but Are They Checking It Twice?: How Erroneous Placement on
Child Offender Lists Offends Procedural Due Process, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1641, 1641 (2011); Daniel J. Steinbock, Data Matching, Data Mining, and Due
Process, 40 GA. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (2005) (describing pattern of erroneous
“indications of criminality”); Christine M. Whalley, Extending the Exclusionary
Rule: Enforcing Data Quality in National Security Databases and Watch Lists,
27 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 257, 259 (2009) (describing errors in
terror lists).
174. Andrew E. Taslitz, Police Are People Too: Cognitive Obstacles to, and
Opportunities for, Police Getting the Individualized Suspicion Judgment Right,
8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 38 (2010).
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the criminal justice system.175 Data can also be overwhelming, with
little practical or technological checks on quality or accuracy.176 Yet,
every day police and prosecutors collect more data on individuals,
and systems are being designed to become more reliant on this data
collection.177 In prior articles, I have laid out the concern of data
error in the criminal justice system.178 From big data to small
data—all data systems generate error.179 Human error, collection
error, processing error, analytical error, application error, or sharing
error all exist and cannot be minimized when this same data is used
to determine human liberty. If prosecutors’ discretionary power
involving bail, charging, and sentencing is informed by erroneous or
merely poorly correlated data, then real injustice could occur.
The issue is not that prosecutors cannot rely on this data within
their existing professional and ethical mandate, but whether they
should. Part III of this Essay will address how prosecutors should
minimize the real risk of using bad or biased data.
B.

Predictive Prosecution and Prosecutorial Role

Predictive prosecution may alter the prosecutor’s role. A
predictive-prosecution focus redirects power away from a reactive
model of prosecution driven by police arrests to a more proactive
model of prosecution. As CSU Chief David O’Keefe stated, “It used
to be we only went where the cases took us. Now, we can build cases
around specific crime problems that communities are grappling
with.”180 While many cities have experimented with community
175. Bryan Llenas, Brave New World of ‘Predictive Policing’ Raises Specter
of High-Tech Racial Profiling, FOX NEWS LATINO (Feb. 25, 2014),
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2014/02/24/brave-new-world-predictive
-policing-raises-specter-high-tech-racial-profiling/ (“‘It ends up being a selffulfilling prophecy,’ said Hanni Fakhoury, staff attorney at the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, a nonprofit digital civil liberties organization. ‘The
algorithm is telling you exactly what you programmed it to tell you. “Young
black kids in the south side of Chicago are more likely to commit crimes,” and
the algorithm lets the police launder this belief. It’s not racism, they can say.
They are making the decision based on what the algorithm is, even though the
algorithm is going to spit back what you put into it. And if the data is biased to
begin with and based on human judgment, then the results the algorithm is
going to spit out will reflect those biases.’”).
176. Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm:
Liberty as Self-Invention, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79, 126 (2009) (noting that
while most databases are supposed to be subject to quality control, “[i]n
reality . . . the evidence is overwhelming that the control measures currently in
place regularly fail, either due to lack of resources, skill, or because they are
simply neglected”).
177. See id. at 125.
178. Ferguson, supra note 7, at 329–30; Logan & Ferguson, supra note 7.
179. See generally Ferguson, supra note 7 (noting that the risk of error
stemming from police databases is significant and that inaccuracies raise
concerns for individual liberty).
180. Fox, supra note 15.
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policing strategies for years,181 and certain grand jury investigations
have been quite proactive, traditionally the majority of state
criminal cases come to prosecutors from police arrests and victim
complaints.182 At least in one version of the prosecutorial role,
prosecutors take the facts and cases as they come to them.
The Investigator Model of predictive prosecution potentially
alters that reality. By broadening the aperture of prosecutorial
responsibility to focus on predictive targeting, the role of the
prosecutor shifts. As an example of how traditional prosecution
practice might change, New York City has a longstanding problem
of drugs and violence in certain apartment complexes.183 For years,
patrol officers dutifully arrested drug sellers and buyers, and
reactively responded to violent incidents.184 The arrests came from
police observations and investigation.185 Over the last few decades,
thousands of individual criminal actors in those complexes have
been arrested and prosecuted.186 In contrast, the Crime Strategies
Unit decision to proactively target and indict 103 members of rival
gangs all in one sweep presents a change in strategy and role.187
The case was driven and directed by the District Attorney’s Office.188
It sent a message of prosecutorial involvement in rooting out crime,
as well a message of prosecutorial understanding of the structural
nature of the crime problem in local areas.
In terms of the power to control criminal suppression in a city,
the predictive prosecution model shifts the identification of problem
areas from the street cops to the lawyers. Prosecutors get to
decide—using all of their discretion, data, and other tools—who to
investigate before an actual precipitating crime occurs. Prosecutors
get to decide to target an individual for incapacitation and use the
tools of bail, charging, and sentencing to do it. Police execute these
decisions, but the power lies with the prosecutors’ office in the first

181. Bruce A. Green & Alafair S. Burke, The Community Prosecutor:
Questions of Professional Discretion, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 285, 287 (2012);
Kay L. Levine, The New Prosecution, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1125, 1157
(2005); Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 CALIF. L. REV.
1593, 1593 (2002).
182. See Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 323 (2002).
183. See Michel Marriot, New York’s Worst Drug Sites: Persistent Markets of
Death, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1989, at A1.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Mac Donald, supra note 94 (“In June 2014, Vance and New York police
commissioner William Bratton (back in New York on his second tour as police
commissioner) announced the largest-ever gang conspiracy indictment in New
York history. One hundred and three members of three West Harlem youth
gangs based in two housing projects were charged with conspiracy to commit
murder and gun possession, among other crimes.”).
188. Id.
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instance.189 While such large scale prosecutorial investigations are
not unusual in federal court or against large scale criminal
enterprises,190 predictive prosecution of street crime might well shift
the balance of power away from police to prosecutors, and even to
smaller units within those prosecution offices.
Beyond street crimes, a move to proactive prosecution might
also shape the types of crimes pursued by prosecutors. It is not
accidental that most state criminal courts are filled with lower-level
crimes that police can personally observe.191
Drug sales,
prostitution, theft, disorderly conduct, and assault are all far more
observable than domestic violence, white collar fraud, or sexual
assault.192 As a result, prosecution resources are devoted toward
reactive policing, not proactive policing.193 A shift toward predictive
prosecution might change that dynamic, with prosecutors taking the
lead to prioritize different types of criminal wrongdoing.
Prosecutors can choose to focus more attention on violence rather
than drug possession,194 or to target human trafficking more than
drug trafficking.195
At the same time, this new role threatens a longstanding source
of legitimacy. Prosecutors have traditionally been expected to be
neutral arbiters in the pursuit of justice.196 As Professor Bruce
Green and Fred Zacharias have written, this neutrality “connotes
independence from the police.”197
Prosecutors have remained
independent from police investigations in order to better evaluate

189. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014); Margaret E.
McGhee, Preliminary Proceedings, Prosecutorial Discretion, 88 GEO. L.J. 1057,
1058–59 (2000).
190. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 189, at 1 (“[M]any
prosecutors participate in investigations involving organized crime, political
corruption, corporate and financial fraud, money laundering, environmental
and other regulatory crimes, and terrorism.”).
191. See THOMAS COHEN ET AL., CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS: EXAMINING THE WORK
OF STATE COURTS 2–3 (2000).
192. See, e.g., id.
193. Mac Donald, supra note 94.
194. Joseph Goldstein, Police Take on Family Violence to Avert Death, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2013, at A1 (“[T]he officers assigned to the domestic violence
unit make a total of 70,000 precautionary visits a year to households with past
episodes. Each precinct station house also maintains a ‘high propensity’ list of a
dozen or so households that get special attention because they are believed to be
most at risk of further violence.”).
195. Bernhard Warner, Google Turns to Big Data to Unmask Human
Traffickers, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2013, 1:46 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2013-04-10/google-turns-to-big-data-to-unmask-human
-traffickers.
196. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004
WIS. L. REV. 837, 837–38 (2004).
197. Id. at 849 (“With respect to garden-variety investigations and
prosecutions, neutrality sometimes connotes independence from the police.”).
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the constitutionality, legality, and moral worth of the prosecution.198
Much of the judicial deference given to prosecutorial discretion
depends on this objective evaluation of whether the case should go
forward.199 Prosecutors, after all, routinely refuse to go forward
with cases brought to them by police.200
The Investigator Model of predictive prosecution blurs this
neutrality as information sharing, strategy, and even execution of
investigations becomes more prosecutor-driven. While prosecutors
can still be objective about the evidence recovered, they may be less
neutral in their role if they planned and implemented the collection
of that evidence.
They might be tempted to engage in the
“competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”201 and thus lose a
measure of objectivity. Prosecutors might be tempted to bring weak
cases simply to incapacitate an individual identified as a primary
target, even though in every other situation that same case would
not be prosecuted.
Charges might be ratcheted up from a
misdemeanor to a felony, not because the facts warrant the increase,
but because the individual has been targeted for incapacitation.
Perhaps just as damaging, the image of prosecutor will be tarnished,
even if there is no actual difference in practice or outcome.202 This is
not to say that prosecutors have not led significant, high-profile
prosecutorial-driven investigations for many years, but they would
now have a different role for low-level street crime involving
repeated thefts, non-homicide shootings, and drug dealing.
The Enforcer Model of predictive policing presents a slightly
different distortion of role. As enforcers, prosecutors become more
dependent on the police data that created the predictive targets. If
the algorithm that creates the Heat List or the information that
guides the gang audit is wrong, then the accompanying
prosecutorial judgments about whether to enforce the threats may
also be wrong. In some ways this reduces the role of prosecutors in
the system at the expense of the data collectors at the police
198. Id. at 860–61 (“Commentators sometimes employ the term ‘neutrality’
to refer to prosecutorial independence from police investigators . . . and other
interested parties.”).
199. Id. at 837–38.
200. See id. at 881.
201. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). The Supreme
Court used this language to describe the understandable danger of police being
overly aggressive in their pursuit of stopping crime, and thus the need to have a
strong Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
202. While perhaps a contestable point that deserves more unpacking, there
exists a general perception about how the public views prosecutorial-driven
investigations, as opposed to ordinary police-driven investigations. Cases
involving insider trading, public corruption, and gangs might be viewed as “the
prosecutor v. the defendant,” whereas a traditional case usually is better
conceived of as “the police v. the defendant.” In that latter role, the prosecutor
is more likely to benefit from the neutrality principle and be trusted more for
his or her exercise of discretion and restraint.
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department. One can imagine that in high-volume jurisdictions
with aggressive predictive policing models, prosecutors will not be in
a position to judge the accuracy or reliability of the person-focused
predictions. In an ideal world, prosecutors would want to know who
was attending the call-in meeting and the appropriateness of their
official threats to not violate the law. In practice, such knowledge
might be improbable to expect. Prosecutors already have too many
cases and responsibilities,203 and adding additional responsibilities
to understand why certain people were summoned to a call-in
meeting may not be feasible. As “enforcers,” prosecutors will likely
simply defer to the police-driven prediction and hope that the
sorting mechanism is accurate.
The blurring of lines also has an impact on the prosecutor’s
responsibility to provide exculpatory information to defendants. The
requirements of Brady disclosure include information known to the
prosecutor and the police.204 In ordinary cases, this would include
information known to the prosecutor through the prosecutor’s
investigation and the relevant police documents or witnesses.205
But, in a world of “extreme collaboration” and within a “seamless
web” of shared databases, those pieces of information become far
more interconnected.206 Prosecutors arguably are responsible for
every fact listed in the shared, searchable database. Almost by
definition, intelligence-driven policing generates more scattered bits
of intelligence about the players involved in criminal activity
(nicknames, gang affiliations, shared addresses, and cooperators).
With interlinked crimes, suspects, and witnesses, the prosecution’s
data systems will likely have more information that could be
exculpatory to defendants.
For example, notes within the arrest alert system could suggest
other gangs or gang members who might have a similar motive for a
violent act, or could include witness statements that discredit the
prosecution’s theory of the case. The line prosecutor may not
personally know any of this information, but the information would
be available in a searchable prosecution-controlled database. Is the
failure to reveal this searchable, available information a
constitutional violation? The danger of integrated databases is that
all of that information becomes collectively imputable to the
prosecutor’s office, which in turn means that the prosecutor is
responsible for providing it to the defense. Similar questions exist
with shared surveillance resources. Information not directly under

203. K. Babe Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in
an Overburdened Criminal Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285, 294
(2014).
204. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963).
205. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Erik Luna, Digital Innocence, 99 CORNELL
L. REV. 981, 1040 (2014).
206. Mac Donald, supra note 94; Skelding, supra note 150.
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the control of the prosecutor’s office could be plausibly denied as not
in the prosecutor’s constructive or actual possession. A system of
extreme collaboration undercuts that argument. A prosecutor who
has access to more information because of more efficient datasharing systems will be responsible for disclosing more because of
that collective knowledge.
This leads to an even bigger change in role, in that prosecutors
may have to become quasi-intelligence analysts in this intelligencedriven system. In the traditional criminal case, a prosecutor is
given thousands of facts through witnesses, police officers,
documents, photographs, investigations, and other sources.207 The
prosecutor knows what she is told by police, and what the evidence
shows, but there is no independent obligation or ability for a
prosecutor to vet the information.208 The facts are usually collected
after the fact, by police not prosecutors, and with an eye toward
what can be proven in court.209 Rumors and theories are useful as
background, but prosecutors are looking for facts they can prove in
court. A natural screening process occurs because the rules of
evidence, burdens of proof, and realities of trial practice all create an
emphasis on credible and provable facts.210
With predictive prosecution technologies, the information
assessment is slightly different. At the investigation stage (as
opposed to the arrest stage), the information is more fragmented.
Facts that could not be proven in court are used to establish the
primary targets.211 Intelligence tips are not always provable. In
addition, they are not always accurate. Prosecutors thus need to
establish systems akin to intelligence analysts in the intelligence
community to vet the credibility and reliability of this raw data. In
both the national security context and the police context, “sources”
lie, deceive, err, and, of course, get things right.212 And only by

207. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 196, at 879 & n.149.
208. See generally Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Agnosticism, 8 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 79, 84–86, 91–99 (2010) (discussing a prosecutor’s obligation to “do
justice” based on the evidence presented to him or her); Bruce A. Green & Ellen
Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction Evidence of
Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 497–501 (2009) (“The prosecutor should
engage in the tricky exercise of determining the credibility of prior evidence
that is no longer available. She should consider all the credible information,
currently available or not, and decide whether the evidence of guilt or innocence
satisfies whatever standard the prosecutor employs.”).
209. See generally Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 208, at 497 (discussing
a prosecutor’s gatekeeping role in charging decisions, and how a prosecutor
must only have evidence that demonstrates “probable cause” at the time of
commencing charges).
210. Burke, supra note 208, at 91.
211. Litman, supra note 161, at 1135.
212. Myrna S. Raeder, See No Evil: Wrongful Convictions and the
Prosecutorial Ethics of Offering Testimony by Jailhouse Informants and
Dishonest Experts, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1413, 1413 (2007).
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establishing a process to evaluate the data can prosecutors trust the
data. This change may require modifications in how prosecutors’
offices process, analyze, vet, and use data, which will be discussed in
Part III.
C.

Predictive Prosecution and Crime Suppression Priorities

Prosecutors’ offices do not just enforce criminal violations, but
also strategize about crime suppression.213
Especially in
jurisdictions with elected prosecutors who must take responsibility
for increased crime rates, crime reduction is a top priority.214
Prosecutorial control of criminal justice priorities strengthens
democratic accountability and connection.215 If a community has
concerns about disproportionate minority arrests for drug
possession, the normal (and defensible) traditional prosecutorial
response is that prosecutors merely handle the cases the police bring
them. While they have the power to decline such prosecutions, they
do not have the power to redirect police efforts to make the
arrests.216
Predictive prosecution changes that dynamic.
Communities could well say to prosecutors that the focus should not
be on drug crimes, but instead gang crimes, or homicides or
whatever the community prioritized. Predictive prosecution thus
gives more power (and therefore more accountability) to prosecutors
to align priorities with their communities.
This reprioritization can also include a shift in how to reduce
crime.
While predictive prosecution certainly maintains an
emphasis on incapacitation and threats of incarceration, it is also
built upon a public health approach to crime. Over the last decade,
many policy makers have been pushing a public health approach to
violence, drug addiction, and criminal activity.217 Person-based
predictive policing explicitly adopted a public health model of
identifying risk factors.
In the same way that certain
environmental toxins increase the risk of cancer, so too do certain
environmental factors increase the risk of violence for youth.218 If
predictive prosecution techniques are used to identify the individual,

213. See Elizabeth Glazer, Thinking Strategically: How Federal Prosecutors
Can Reduce Violent Crime, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573, 573–74 (1999); Charles
J. Hynes, The Evolving Prosecutor: Broadening the Vision, Expanding the Role,
24 CRIM. JUST. 1, 41 (2009); Levine, supra note 181, at 1130.
214. See Andrew Novak, It’s Too Dangerous to Elect Prosecutors, DAILY
BEAST (Aug. 24, 2015, 1:12 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/08
/24/it-s-too-dangerous-to-elect-prosecutors.html.
215. See id.
216. See
What
Does
a
Prosecutor
Do?,
BEST LAW. GUIDE,
http://www.thebestlawyersguide.com/what-does-a-prosecutor-do (last visited
Aug. 28, 2016).
217. See supra notes 89–97.
218. See Papachristos & Kirk, supra note 95, at 528–29.
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human risks, as well as the casualties of those risks, then certain
public health–like interventions could be implemented.
These intervention strategies do not need to involve police or
prosecutors or the threat of incarceration. In fact, part of the
predictive policing model in Chicago and other cities expressly
recognizes that social services and community pressure may be more
effective than law enforcement.219 As just one example, the Chicago
VRS intervention system structured its call-in meetings to balance
any law enforcement discussion with equal parts community
involvement and social services.220 The point was to emphasize that
the solutions to criminal activity could be found through available
community and social services resources.221 The question, of course,
is whether this same public health intervention strategy can work
without the “stick” of prosecutorial enforcement. Analytically, the
identification of risk and the remediating of risk are separate
problems. Neither has to be led by police or prosecutors. But, due
to practical, political, and financial reasons, they appear to be bound
together for the near future.
Predictive prosecution, because it is a proactive approach, can
also shift priorities to look at underlying environmental drivers of
crime, rather than simply responding to criminal activity.
Predictive analytics can isolate places that attract criminal
activities.222 Environmental criminologists have long written about
problematic hot spots223 and predictive policing techniques are now
policing some of those areas.224 But, prosecutors might be able to
intervene at a more elevated political or policy level. Prosecutors
might be able to use political capital to alter the physical landscape
in a community, engage with community stakeholders, or even
develop social services programs to help individuals from the
community. If, for example, a particular area is known for car
thefts, because the environment of abandoned buildings, dark
streets, and easy escape routes provides a tempting opportunity for
criminal activity, then prosecutors could work with communities
and politicians to remedy the environmental risks. Or prosecutors
could, as the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office has done,225

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 533–34.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 140–48, and accompanying text.
Michael D. Reisig, Community and Problem-Oriented Policing, 39
CRIME & JUST. 1, 40 (2010) (discussing environmental criminology).
224. See supra notes 29–43.
225. Press Release, N.Y. Cty. Dist. Att’y’s Office, D.A. Vance Announces
Funding for Innovative Crime Prevention Initiatives and Programs to Improve
Access to Services for Victims of Crime (June 23, 2016), http://manhattanda.org
/press-release/da-vance-announces-funding-innovative-crime-prevention
-initiatives-and-programs-improv.
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partner with community groups to sponsor youth sports and
academic events in troubled areas.
Finally, predictive prosecution encourages a shift in looking at
crime patterns from a network perspective. Traditional prosecution
tends to focus on individuals. We think of crime as a function of
individual choice, not environmental influences.226 While many
prosecutors’ offices have targeted large-scale crime networks, the
majority of cases involve a limited number of suspects targeted for
particular completed crimes.227 Predictive prosecution has the
potential to shift the focus of attention from individuals to networks
and from individual choices to social group influences. This shift is
not a wholesale shift. Clearly, predictive prosecution seeks to
identify specific individuals to be placed in databases of targeted
suspects. These individuals are placed there because of their choice
to break the law. But, because of its focus on gangs, neighborhoods,
and social media networks, predictive prosecution also allows for
broader understanding of criminal relationships and patterns. The
“intelligence” of intelligence-driven policing is to see how the
networks of violent actors interact, and then do something to
interrupt those cycles of violence.
As a hypothetical example, prosecutors may know that one
hundred young men live in a particular housing complex and ten of
those men are actively involved in social media posts that boast
about violence, criminal activity, and lawlessness. Seeing this group
as a network, and not ten individuals, does several helpful things.
First, it allows for a study of the interrelation between the ten men.
Some may be instigators of violence, some might be followers, and
some might be silent, non-participants.
This might allow
prosecutors to prioritize within the group about the more dangerous
of the group. In addition, it allows prosecutors to see how the
network extends across neighborhoods and generations. Prosecutors
can see who else might be connected to this group, and thus brought
into its ambit. Most criminal networks are bounded by geography
and family,228 so one could almost predict who might be the next
individual joining the group.
Studying this group to figure out why certain individuals have
not joined the group might also be valuable. Is it friendship,
finances, some triggering event that links the ten together and
doesn’t include the other ninety? Is there a new group that has
arrived in an area? Are there correlations that can be drawn to
explain why certain people remain outside the network of potential
criminality? Predictive prosecution thus might allow a study of why
226. Kenneth Padowitz, Rational Choice as a Theory of Crime, PSYCHOL. L.
& CRIM. BEHAV. BLOG, http://www.psychology-criminalbehavior-law.com/2016
/04/rational-choice-as-a-theory-of-crime/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2016).
227. See Ferguson, supra note 7, at 380.
228. See supra notes 111–26 and accompanying text.
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certain networks form, about connections arising
neighborhoods, schools, or environments. While sociologists
been studying this phenomenon for a century,229 and
prosecutors and police officers could tell you about this reality
experience, a network theory of criminal justice has not yet
operationalized in practice in most prosecutors’ offices.

from
have
most
from
been

III. PRINCIPLES FOR PREDICTIVE PROSECUTION
Predictive technologies are not new to the criminal justice
system.230 Since the 1920s the lure of predictive insights has led the
criminal justice system to try to forecast the future.231 Predictors for
recidivism,232 pretrial detention,233 sex offenders,234 juveniles,235 and
a host of actuarial solutions have been proposed.236 Predictive
policing, and now predictive prosecution, fit that pattern.
For almost as long as their creation, the critiques of these
predictive technologies have identified the same concerns over and
over again.
Predictive correlations become mistaken for
causation,237 validation studies fail to validate,238 analytical

229. See MICHAEL D. LYMAN & GARY W. POTTER, ORGANIZED CRIME 59, 66 (4th
ed.
2007),
http://wps.pearsoncustom.com/wps/media/objects/6904/7070214
/CRJ455_Ch02.pdf.
230. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING AND
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 145 (2007); Bernard E. Harcourt, From the
Ne’er-Do-Well to the Criminal History Category: The Refinement of the Actuarial
Model in Criminal Law, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 112 (2003).
231. Harcourt, supra note 230, at 112.
232. See, e.g., Melissa Hamilton, Adventures in Risk: Predicting Violent and
Sexual Recidivism in Sentencing Law, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 5 (2015); Dawinder S.
Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671, 718 (2015).
233. Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L.
REV. 497, 512–13 (2012); Jack F. Williams, Process and Prediction: A Return to
a Fuzzy Model of Pretrial Detention, 79 MINN. L. REV. 325, 337–38 (1994).
234. Melissa Hamilton, Public Safety, Individual Liberty, and Suspect
Science: Future Dangerousness Assessments and Sex Offender Laws, 83 TEMP. L.
REV. 697, 737 (2011); Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of
Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and
Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 1454–55 (2003).
235. Jeffrey Fagan & Martin Guggenheim, Preventative Detention and the
Judicial Prediction of Dangerousness for Juveniles: A Natural Experiment, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 429 (1996); Albert R. Roberts & Kimberly
Bender, Overcoming Sisyphus: Effective Prediction of Mental Health Disorders
and Recidivism Among Delinquents, 70 FED. PROB. 19, 20 (2006).
236. See generally Policing Predictive Policing, supra note 28 (describing the
different types of risk assessments and predictive tools used throughout the
criminal justice system).
237. Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior
with Statistical Inference and Individual Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1446
(1979) (discussing the differences between correlations and causation).
238. See, e.g., William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of
Informal (Subjective, Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic)
Prediction Procedures: The Clinical-Statistical Controversy, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB.
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mistakes infect the legitimacy of the conclusions, and error—small
and systemic—pervades all data-driven systems.239
The concept of predictive prosecution provides the same promise
and potential critique. Yet, because of the prosecutor’s special role
in the criminal justice system, there may be some cause for
optimism. If designed carefully, a predictive prosecution system
might provide an accountability mechanism to police data error and
moderate blind reliance on data-driven predictions.
While a full descriptive framework is beyond the scope of this
Essay, any predictive prosecution system must be built on four
related principles: ownership, accuracy, transparency, and fairness.
These principles are explained below, with recognition that
significant additional discussion and debate is needed before the
adoption of any predictive prosecution program.
First, prosecutors must accept ownership of the data underlying
predictive prosecution systems. If bail determinations, charging
decisions, or sentencing is impacted at all by data correlations
(being on the SSL list or being identified as one of the primary
targets in New York City), then that underlying data must be
trustworthy enough to withstand scrutiny of judges inquiring about
the bases of the lists or reasons for the decisions. Whether from a
predictive policing system or organically developed by prosecutors,
once used in court, prosecutors must take responsibility for the
data.240
Integrating police and prosecutorial systems, even
informally, means that prosecutors must take on a data
management duty that they previously did not have to accept.
Second, and relatedly, prosecutors must ensure the accuracy of
the data. In adopting theories of intelligence collection to augment
traditional prosecution roles, prosecutors should also examine how
intelligence agencies test and assess the data collected. In the
national security context, thousands of intelligence analysts work
for the United States government because of a healthy distrust of
the raw intelligence coming in from sources.241 Intricate internal
systems exist to evaluate the reliability of data,242 recognizing that
actionable data for targeting cannot be relied upon without critical
analysis. So, too, with intelligence-driven prosecution, prosecutors
must establish systems to assess the value of the data coming in
through community sources, detectives, social media, and other
sources.

POL’Y & L. 293, 302 (1996); Bernard E. Harcourt, The Shaping of Chance:
Actuarial Models and Criminal Profiling at the Turn of the Twenty-First
Century, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 105, 125–26 (2003).
239. See supra notes 173–79 and accompanying text.
240. See supra Part I.
241. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TODAY’S FBI FACTS & FIGURES 2013–2014, at 9
(2014), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/facts-and-figures-031413-2.pdf/view.
242. See id. at 72.
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In addition, this push for accuracy means developing systems to
audit existing data-collection systems, including mechanisms for
removal and alteration of bad or outdated data. The danger of a
high-volume data collection enterprise is that it is much easier to
simply collect everything, accurate or not.243 Going back to correct
errors involves time, money, and technological sophistication.244
But, without such checks, the data becomes unworthy of use in
criminal courts.
Direct connection to criminality, not mere
correlation, should be required when an individual’s liberty is being
decided. Processes must be created to ensure that personal bias or
corruption does not distort the targeting.
Further, the data
collection and analysis must be scrutinized for implicit or explicit
bias.245 Disproportionate minority contacts, high incarceration
rates, and harsh sentencing have been clearly demonstrated
throughout the criminal justice system.246 Any data-driven system
built on top of that inequality will likely reify the inequality unless
explicit steps are taken to address the issue.
Third, any data system must be transparent.247 This involves a
two-fold transparency, both to the prosecutor using the data and the
community legitimizing the use of the data. Prosecutors are lawyers
trained in law, not technology. In large offices the data will be
compiled by colleagues and assistants. In systems of “extreme
collaboration,” data will also be compiled by police. So, mechanisms
must be created so that prosecutors can understand the source of
the data. Prosecutors need to be able to not only trust, but
understand and defend the data. Arguments cannot be along the
lines of “judge, I am asking for a no bond bail determination because
the pre-printed form told me to ask for it,” but because of

243. Kevin Lapp, Databasing Delinquency, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 195, 211–12
(2015) (“Even when [gang database] purging procedures are in place, they are
rarely carried out. That is because there is little incentive for law enforcement
to purge records from gang databases.”).
244. J. Christopher Westland, The Cost of Errors in Software Development:
Evidence from Industry, 62 J. SYS. & SOFTWARE 1, 1 (2002).
245. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Blindsight: The Absurdity of Color-Blind
Criminal Justice, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 3 (2007); Tracey G. Gove, Implicit
Bias and Law Enforcement, POLICE CHIEF, Oct. 2011, at 44, 50 (“Police officers
are human and, as the theory contends, may be affected by implicit biases just
as any other individual. In other words, well-intentioned officers who err may
do so not as a result of intentional discrimination, but because they have what
has been proffered as widespread human biases.”).
246. Robin Walker Sterling, Raising Race, CHAMPION, Apr. 2011, at 24, 24
(“The criminal justice system has exploded outside of the prison walls, as well.
As of 2009, the number of people under criminal justice supervision—including
those who are in jail, in prison, on probation, and on parole—totaled 7.2 million
people. In a dismaying parallel to incarceration rates, people of color are also
overrepresented among arrestees, probationers, and parolees.”).
247. Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503,
1533–34 (2013).
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particularized, verifiable facts that can be obtained through a datadriven system. Arguments cannot be “judge, the defendant is on the
SSL, so we ask that he be held,” but based on the actual underlying
facts that might have led some individual to be on that list.
Prosecutorial transparency requires understanding why individuals
have been chosen to be marked by predictive technologies. This
understanding may also require knowledge of the provenance of the
data, the currency of the data, and the reliability of the data.
The other aspect of transparency focuses on community
acceptance of predictive prosecution outcomes. The Orwellian
nature of government lists of predicted targets rightly causes
suspicion.248 Any predictive prosecution system needs to be able to
explain, in a relatively open and clear way, how people are placed on
predictive lists, and why the criteria is legitimate. This presents a
challenge in that most prosecution or police methods also need to be
relatively opaque in order to avoid undermining ongoing
investigations.249
This balance between transparency and
operational secrecy presents real tensions. But, as the creation of
custom notification letters demonstrate, prosecutors can develop a
process to show and explain why someone is targeted. Custom
notification letters are “customized” and include the target’s specific
criminal history and risk factors.250 The reasons for the targeting
are thus particularized and individualized and open for
inspection.251 Similarly, in call-ins, prosecutors can explain in
specific detail why the particular targets have been contacted. This
process provides transparency and legitimacy to the process (albeit
after the fact).
This type of customization also needs to be applied systemically.
Prosecutors need to be able to explain why certain communities
have been targeted, and how they have attempted to avoid class or
race-based impacts.
Using crime mapping, visual displays of
historic criminal activity, and other accessible media, the argument
can be made for why certain areas were chosen and not others.
Discriminatory impacts need to be monitored and studied.
Communities may accept a higher prevalence of prosecutorial
interest in an area, but it must be explained and defended in a
transparent manner.
Finally, predictive prosecution systems must build in
mechanisms to ensure fair process. An emphasis on fairness must
address concerns that citizens might hold in being targeted by
predictive techniques. A process will need to be developed to
248. See generally George Orwell, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949) (presenting
a novel about a nation living under omnipresent government surveillance).
249. Clearly, prosecutors do not want to reveal the targets of their
investigation. In addition, safety issues of officers must be taken into account.
250. See supra notes 71–79 and accompanying text.
251. See id.
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challenge a target designation on a police list.252 A method to
account for possible racial or class discrimination will need to be
created.253 Clear procedures to use and validate the predictive
target list needs to be developed.254 And, a general emphasis on
procedural justice must continue. Due to the influence of some of
the academics who provided the early inspiration for the Chicago
projects, procedural justice has been a key organizing principle
behind the intervention strategy, but such an emphasis must
continue to be prioritized.255
An emphasis on fairness must include a focus on other players
in the criminal justice system. Fairness includes procedures to
address exculpatory information available in the database and other
discovery issues that will necessarily arise.256 In an interconnected
system, owned and operated by the prosecutors’ offices, Brady
material will be stored in the shared files. Disclosure of this shared
information will require a new system because traditional case
separations and information barriers will no longer exist. Finally,
fairness includes the ability to defend the data-collection system in a
court when challenged by defendants, judges, or internal
accountability groups. These fairness principles and concerns
undergird most of the existing criminal justice system, so the
demand should be neither surprising nor objectionable.
CONCLUSION
Predictive prosecution exists in an experimental phase. This
Essay seeks to raise preliminary questions about an obviously
nascent experiment. But, the questions are real, and will need to be
answered soon. The hope of this brief Essay is to set forth the
possible impacts, raise questions, and plan for the future of
predictive prosecution.
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